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Descent and Distribution - Common Law Marriage
In Walker v. Walker,' a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
case, arising on appeal from the Western District of South
Carolina, jurisdiction of the District Court was asserted on
two grounds, "(1) diversity of citizenship, and (2) uncon-
stitutionality of the laws of the State of South Carolina
which, in effect, deny to the child of an alleged common-law
marriage the right to inherit from the father." The Court
noted that substantially the same questions had been involved
in earlier litigation2 between the same parties and had been
disposed of adversely to the plaintiff, and for the same
reasons as there it sustained the District Court's dismissal
in this case. In reality, however, in the earlier case the
attack was made on the constitutionality of the statute which
confines inheritance by an illegitimate to taking from the
mother 3 and from the mother's side, while here the assertion
was that unconstitutionality resided in denial "to the child
of an alleged common-law marriage the right to inherit from
the father." Whether this is only the plaintiff's view of
South Carolina law, or whether it is also the Court's, the
proposition is novel and also incorrect. The statute, already
noted, limiting inheritance from the mother speaks of an
illegitimate child, which presupposes no marriage or an in-
valid marriage.4 It nowhere declares, nor is there any other
statute declaring, that the child of a common-law marriage
cannot inherit from both parents. It hardly requires a search
of authority to be aware that the child of a common-law
marriage, which is as valid in South Carolina as a ceremonial
marriage, is legitimate and entitled as such to inherit from
mother and father.5
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 295 F. 2d 35 (1961).
2. 274 F. 2d 425 (1960), reviewed in 1959-1960 Survey of South Caro-
lina Law 13 S.C.L.Q. 97.
3. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-53 (1952).
4. By statute, in some cases, the offspring of an invalid marriage may
nevertheless be legitimate. See CODE Or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 20-5
and 20-6.1 (1952).
5. See Common-Law Marriage, 12 S.C.L.Q. 355 (1960). See, also,
Campbell v. Christian, 235 S. C. 102, 110 S. E. 2d 1 (1959); Mitchell v.
Smyser, 236 S. C. 332, 114 S. E. 2d 226 (1960).
242
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Descent and Distribution - Legitimacy
The report of the case of Edwards v. Edwards6 describes
the action as having been brought by the plaintiff "to have
himself declared the natural child of W. S. Edwards and
therefore an heir of James M. Edwards." The action actually
was to recover a share of the intestate estate of James M.
Edwards (who died in 1958), a brother of W. S. Edwards,
who had died in 1953. The ultimate question was as to the
legitimacy of the plaintiff, who alleged himself to be a child
of W. S. Edwards. The appeal concerned itself solely with
the question of whether the plaintiff was actually the child
-of W. S. Edwards, and was disposed of solely on that point,
the Supreme Court sustaining the jury's finding that the
-plaintiff was the natural child of the alleged father. The
principal issue was one of evidence - namely, the admis-
sibility of the United States census report for 1920 listing
W. S. Edwards and the plaintiff's mother as husband and
wife, and the plaintiff as one of their children.
The resolution of the paternity of the plaintiff was im-
Iortant because admittedly the mother of the plaintiff was
not married to W. S. Edwards at the time of the plaintiff's
birth. The marriage took place in 1915, when the plaintiff
was four years old. Prior to 1950 the subsequent marriage
,of the parents of a child born out of wedlock would not
legitimate the child,7 but legislation enacted in that year and
in 1951 provides that the subsequent marriage of the parents
-of a child born out of wedlock legitimates the child, and
that the legislation is retroactive to the extent that it applies
"in all cases in which prior to May 2, 1951, the parents of an
illegitimate child shall have married and the father and such
,child have been living on said date."8 If the plaintiff was
in fact the child of W. S. Edwards, he would, by virtue of
his father's marriage to his mother in 1915, in the view
,of the statute, be legitimate. If he were not in fact the
iatural child, the statute of course would not apply. The
,question of law - the applicability of the statute to the facts
in the case - was reserved by the lower court. What its
-ultimate disposition has been is not disclosed by subsequent
reported litigation, and there is no judicial ascertainment
6. 239 S. C. 85, 121 S. E. 2d 432 (1961).
7. Foster v. Roland, 205 S. C. 457, 32 S. E. 2d 375 (1944).
8. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 20-5.1 (1952), applied in
,Campbell v. Christian, note 5, supra.
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so far on the question of whether legitimation under the
circumstances would extend to inheritance not merely from
the father but by representation through him - although it
would logically seem that the legitimation would be operative
in all phases of inheritance.
Executors and Administrators - Claim Against Estate
The problem of the applicability of the statute relieving
lands bona fide aliened by heirs or devisees from claims of
creditors9 is posed in Harwell v. Scott,10 which was an action
by a creditor to set aside a conveyance made by a sole heir
at law of an intestate and to have the land sold in aid of
assets. The named defendant was the heir, and the admin-
istratrix of the estate, of her father, who died in 1956. In
January, 1958, the plaintiff in this action had brought suit to
foreclose a mortgage on another piece of property owned
by the decedent and filed a lis pendens in connection with
the suit. In her complaint she waived judgment for any
deficiency, but in January, 1959, she amended her complaint
to ask for such a judgment. The mortgaged property was
thereafter sold with a resultant deficiency judgment, and
it was this debt which was the basis of the plaintiff's claim
in the present action. Before the complaint's amendment,
the defendant, in June, 1958, conveyed the property in suit
to a realty company (which was joined as a defendant in this
action) for a recited consideration of $100 and the satis-
faction of a claim for $670 held by the grantee against the
estate. It was this conveyance - made more than six months
after the intestate's death, for a valuable consideration, and
before any action brought on the debt to the plaintiff -
which the plaintiff sought to set aside.
The lower court, affirming the report of the master, dis-
missed the action on the ground that the transfer was a
bona fide alienation for valuable consideration within the
meaning of § 19-704 of the Code. The exceptions raised
only the point that the consideration was nominal and grossly
inadequate. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court.
9. CODE: OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-704 (1952). The statute
defines a bona fide alienation as an alienation "based upon valuable con-
sideration between the parties thereto and made before action brought and
after the expiration of six months following the death of the ancestor or
testator." See Floyd Mortuary, Inc. v. Newman, 222 S. C. 421, 73 S. E. 2d
444 (1953) for construction of this language.
10. 238 S. C. 267, 120 S. E. 2d 106 (1961),
[Vol. 15
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The Court pointed out that at the time of the conveyance,
the plaintiff, having elected to look solely to her security by
waiver of the deficiency, was no longer in the position of
a general creditor of the estate, and she could therefore
not complain of the conveyance which had been made; and
that her subsequent amendment to recover a deficiency judg-
ment and obtaining it could not restore her to her original
position as a creditor having both a security and a debt -
at least not as to the intervening rights of the grantee.
In any view of the case, it would be difficult to conceive
of fraud or impropriety committed through the conveyance,
whatever may have been the motive and however slight the
consideration, if at the time of the conveyance there was
no general obligation of the estate to the plaintiff. The
Court further declared that the defendant did not have to
invoke § 19-704 of the Code as protection against the plain-
tiff's claim, and that the plaintiff's only ground of attack
could be that of fraud, which she had not made out.11
Wills - Construction
In Citizens & Southern Natl Bank v. Roach,12 the ques-
tion was whether certain language in the will in suit indicated
a future, rather than a present, testamentary intent. The
will was drawn by the testator himself, a layman - a factor
to which the court called attention. It gave a sum of money
in trust to the testator's foster son on condition that he not
marry a certain woman, and in the event he did so marry
"his part will then go to Frank G. Roach" (the named de-
fendant). The trust was to pay the foster son a stated sum
of money until he reached the age of 35, when the corpus
and accumulations were to be paid over to him. It was then,
in the same item, provided "In case of the death of T. J.
Blackwood [the foster son] any amount left will be willed
to Frank G. Roach, my brother."
The legatee, T. J. Blackwood, died before the testator,
without having married. The contention on the part of
11. The grantee realty company, however, to protect its title to the land,
would have to rely upon the statute. It would seem, under the facts, that
by waiving her judgment, the, plaintiff may also have foregone the right
to look to the grantor-heir for what had been received for the conveyance
or for the land's value. The statute, while it relieves the land from debts,
does not relieve the heir who has sold it. He remains liable for the value
of the land he has sold. CODE OF LAws OF SoUTH CAROLINA § 19-703
(1952).
12: 239 S. C. 231, 122 S. E. 2d 644 (1961).
1962]
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those resisting the claim of Frank G. Roach was that the
words "will be willed" denoted an intent on the part of the
testator to make only a future disposition of the fund, which
would negative an effective disposition of the fund in favor
of the brother, with a consequent intestacy - there being
no residuary clause. The contention of the brother was
that he was an alternative legatee, taking by the will itself.
To this position both the lower court and the Supreme Court
agreed. The issue to which the Court addressed itself and
the governing principles were thus stated:
Did he [the testator] intend to thereby designate Frank
G. Roach as substitute legatee in the event of the death
of the primary legatee, T. J. Blackwood, or did he merely
express an intention to do so in some future instrument?
To constitute a valid bequest to Frank G. Roach, the
language must have been used in a dispositive sense at
the time of the execution of the will. If the provision
refers to something which the testator intended to do
in the future, as opposed to something then being done
by him, it does not constitute a testamentary disposition.
The Court, in reaching its conclusion, attended to the rule
that the will was to be read as a whole and the language of
the controversial item not to be read in isolation. The ap-
pellants' contention was that the words "will be willed"
were "unambiguous language of futurity" and did not show
the necessary testamentary intent. The Court remarked that
"If the foregoing language is isolated from the other pro-
visions of the will, the contention of the appellants would
probably be correct." There were fifteen bequests in the
will, and in each there were alternative bequests. The lan-
guage was varied: "will be willed"; "shall be paid over,"
"will then go," "this money goes," and "is to go." The
Court's view was that these expressions were all used in the
same sense - namely, to indicate a presently made disposi-
tion by way of substitution. Nothing else in the will indicated
the contrary, and the interpretation given by the lower court
was the reasonable one which effected the intention of the
testator and gave force to every part of the will.
There can hardly be dissent from the result reached by
the Court and the reasoning used to arrive at it. One may,
however, differ with the Court's observation that if the
words "will be willed" were "isolated from the other provi-
[Vol. 15
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sions of the will, the contention of the appellants would prob-
ably be correct." If the will consisted of a single dispositive
item bequeathing the entire estate in the same fashion, it
would be, it is submitted, improbable and implausible, rather
than the converse, that the testator intended to perform some
future act to bring the second gift into operation.
Although the words were "unambiguously" in the future
tense, the sense or meaning of the words would not neces-
sarily be limited to future conduct by the testator. The
words "will be willed" can carry the imputation of adding
to them the words "by this will," rather than the imputed
addition of "by me." Taking into account the presumption
against intestacy, it could well be argued that the words
pointed unambiguously to a present disposition, or at least
that they presented a patent ambiguity which could be re-
solved from the will itself.'
3
In two other cases in the survey period involving construc-
tion of wills the Court makes mention of and resorts to some
familiar rules of construction. The cases, Black v. Gettys,14
and Leathers v. Leathers,15 are dealt with in detail under
the heading of Property, since they deal with the nature of
estates created, but they are relevant here for their con-
sideration of the rules of construction. Both make the point
that the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and
effectuate the testator's intention, unless it contravenes some
well settled rule of law or public policy, and that each portion
of the will must be considered in relation to the other por-
tions. These propositions have already been noted in Citizens
& Southern Nat'l Bank v. Roach, discussed just previously
under this topic. In addition, in Leathers v. Leathers, the
Court, in dealing with a testamentary trust, utilizes the
presumption against intestacy, andi extehnds it similarly
against intestacy as to any part of the corpus of a tes-
tamentary trust.
In Dial v. Ridgewood Tuberculosis Sanatorium,'6 the con-
structional question was whether a direction in the testatrix's
will that all estate and inheritance taxes be paid from the
residuary estate was intended to charge the residue solely as
13. See Jennings v. Tabert, 77 S. C. 454, 58 S. E. 420 (1907) ; Rogers v.
Morrell, 82 S. C. 402, 64 S. E. 143 (1908).
14. 238 S. C. 167, 119 S. E. 2d 660 (1961).
15. 239 S. C. 94, 121 S. E. 2d 354 (1961).
16. 240 S. C. 64, 124 S. E. 2d 598 (1962).
1962]
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against property which was appointed by the testatrix under
a power contained in her late husband's will. The lower court
held that there should be an equitable apportionment among
the residuary beneficiaries and the beneficiaries of the ap-
pointed property. The Supreme Court reversed. Perhaps
the principal factor that led the Court to the determination
of the testatrix's intent that the residuary estate alone
should bear the burden of the taxes was her use through-
out of the terms "give, devise and bequeath" with respect
to not only her individual property but the property which
she disposed of by appointment. Other language in her will
gave rise to the same conclusion. Also influential was the
fact that the testatrix had been advised by her counsel, who
had estimated the value of her estate, that it included the
property subject to the power of appointment.
The lower court had relied upon Myers v. Sinkler,17 in which
there had been a holding of apportionability, but the Supreme
Court noted essential differences in the two cases, pointing
out that there the taxable estate consisted of "two separate
entities" - the probate estate and the assets of an irrevoc-
able inter vivos trust over which the testatrix had no power
of testamentary disposition - and that the will did not
indicate an intention to charge the residuary probate estate
"with the burden of the taxes generated by the non-probate
estate." In Myers, the Court said, the testatrix was not aware
that the assets of the non-probate trust were part of the
taxable estate; in this case the testatrix knew that the prop-
erty subject to appointment comprised a part of that estate;
and while the property passed to the appointees by virtue
of the power created by her husband's will the power to
dispose of it by her will "was as absolute as if she had owned
it personally."
Resulting Trust - Constructive Trust - Laches
In Ramantanin v. Poulos,18 an attempt on the part of the
plaintiff to establish a resulting or constructive trust in real
estate, the title to which had been taken by his deceased
father, was defeated because of laches. The basic conten-
tion of the plaintiff was that funds derived from the sale
of property owned by his father as life tenant and himself
17. 235 S. C. 162, 110 S. E. 2d 241 (1960).
18. 240 S. C. 13, 124 S. E. 2d 611 (1962).
[Vol. 15
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as remainderman had been invested by the father in the
purchase of the real estate in suit in the father's sole name,
in violation of a written agreement between them that the
funds so realized should be held in the same interests and
when they were invested the investment was to be owned in
the same way. The master and the circuit judge concurred in
finding that the evidence fell short of "that clear, definite and
unequivocal proof required in the establishment of either a
resulting or constructive trust," and that even if a trust
relationship had been proved the plaintiff was barred by
his laches. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide
whether the alleged trust met the standard required, or
whether the trust was resulting or constructive,1" and upheld
the conclusions below as to laches. A significant factor lead-
ing to the result was that the plaintiff knew in 1947 that
title to the property purchased was in the father's sole name
(the purchase had been made two years earlier), and the
further fact that a demand had been made by the plaintiff
upon his father in that year for a correction of the title
according to the agreement, followed by a refusal by the
father, and without later prosecution of a suit by the plain-
tiff to enforce his demand. The father died in 1959, and
this suit was not commenced until 1960. Applying the tests
for laches - "laches connotes not only undue lapse of time,
but also negligence and opportunity to have acted sooner,
and all these three factors must be satisfactorily shown be-
fore the bar in equity is complete '20 - the Court concluded
that from the facts all these elements were present and
were therefore sufficient to bar the plaintiff's assertion of
his rights.
21
19. As to the difference between a purchase-money resulting trust and a
constructive trust where the funds of another person are used in the
acquisition of property, see the 1960-1961 Survey of South Carolina Law,
14 S.C.L.Q. 264, n. 84 (1962). The facts showed that the father had bought
the land with his own money. The controversy actually revolved about the
funds used in erecting improvements upon it. If the trust funds were used
in improvements, the remedy would seem to be an equitable lien, rather
than a resulting or constructive trust. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, §
206 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 202, comm. f. (1959).
See Brazel v. Fair, 26 S. C. 370, 2 S. E. 293 (1886).
20. The quotation is from Babb v. Sullivan, 43 S. C. 236, 21 S. E. 279
(1894).
21. It would seem that the father's known repudiation of the trust in
1947 would start the Statute of Limitations running and would bar the
action without regard to the elements appropriate for laches. See Jones v.
Goodwin, 10 Rich. Eq. 226 (S. C. 1858), constructive trust; Beard v.
Stanton, 15 S. C. 164 (1880), constructive trust; Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C.
237, 55 S. E. 310 (1906), purchase-money resulting trust; 45 A.L.R. 2d
.1962] 249
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The vital issue of lapse of time also arose in another
case, Brunson v. Sports.22 There were in addition, however,
important issues as to the nature of the trust created, the
status of a purchaser from the alleged trustee, and the
outcome of an accounting. The action was one to impress
a trust upon land to which one of the defendants had legal
title. The facts began with administration of an estate in
1929 and a debtor's conveyance of land to the administratix
in her individual name in consideration of the surrender
of a note given by the debtor to the intestate. The admin-
istratrix was an heir - a sister of the decedent - and the
other beneficiaries were a niece and nephews, children of
a predeceased sister. The grantee's purpose in accepting the
conveyance was to hold the land for the benefit of herself
and the other heirs - a fact which in part was demonstrated
by a petition signed by her, addressed to the probate judge,
declaring that she held in trust for those entitled to the prop-
erty of the estate she represented. The petition sought
the Probate Court's approval of the transaction, but only
a prepared but unsigned order was found. The grantee oc-
cupied the land until 1951 when she sold it to one R. A.
Dukes, one of the defendants. The aunt died in 1955, and
this action was begun in 1956.
The lower court held that the land was subject to a trust
in favor of the niece and nephews as to one-half the property,
that the right was not barred by lapse of time, and that the
holder of the legal title had to account. The Supreme Court
affirmed except as to the amount due on the accounting.
The holding both below and on appeal was that in effect
the administratrix had in good faith taken title to property
with fiduciary funds and that thereupon a resulting trust
arose in favor of the heirs, other than herself, as to one-
half.2 3 Both courts held that the administratix's subsequent
382 (1956) ; 55 A.L.R. 2d 220 (1957). See also, Brunson v. Sports, note 22,
infra, discussed in this Survey.
22. 239 S. C. 58, 121 S. E. 2d 294 (1961).
23. Relying on Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926);
Haynsworth v. Bischoff, 6 S. C. 159 (1874) ; Walker v. Taylor, 104 S. C. 1,
88 S. E. 300 (1916). Whether a resulting trust as distinguished from a
constructive trust arises where a fiduciary uses funds of his estate to ac-
quire property in his individual name seems, in South Carolina, to depend
upon whether there was good faith in the use of the funds: resulting trust
if there was, constructive trust if there was not. Green v. Green, 56 S. C.
193, 34 S. E. 249 (1899). But see Palmetto Lumber Co. v. Risley, 25 S. C.
309 (1886), where the president of a company satisfied a debt of the
[Vol. 15
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conduct - i.e., after obtaining title - indicated her good
faith and revealed the facts from which the alleged benefi-
ciaries' rights arose. The Supreme Court's statement is that
"It, in substance, placed her in the same relationship to the
property and to the cestui que trust as that of an express
trustee. ' 24 Both courts rejected the defense of laches, which
was based on two grounds: (1) that the original grantee
company in consi4eration of the transfer to him individually of real estate,
the lower court terming the trust constuctive, and the Supreme Court
calling it resulting. See, also, McNefl v. Morrow, Rich. Eq. Cases 172
(S. C. 1832), where a guardian satisfied a debt to his estate by taking a
transfer of slaves to himself; the trust was termed resulting. In somecases there h s been no d scription of the trust other tha  as a trut.
Brazel v. Fair, 26 5. C. 370, 2 5. E. 293 (1886) ; Sparks v. MIcCraw, 112
S. C. 519, 100 S. E. 161 (1919); Richardsqn v. Day, 20 5. C. 412 (1883).On the whole, however, the cases in South Carolina have been fairly con-
sistent in treating the trust created in good faith obtaining of title by the
fiduciary as resulting. Phillips v. Yon, 61 5. C. 246, 39 5. E. 618 (1901);
Ex Parte Jlohnson, 145 5. C. 259, 288, 145 S. E. 113 (1928). The inclusionin tie catalogue of resulting trusts of the trust arising from use of trust
funds seems to stem from the classification of resulting trusts employed
by PRRY TRUSTS § 38 (3d ed. 1882), cited in Rogers v. Rogers, 52 5. C.
388, 29 5. E. 812 (1897), and followed frequently thereafter. The RE-STATEMheT (SscoND), TRUSTS (1959) does not inhude acquisition of prop-
erty by a fiduciary in its list of situations producing a resulting trust -
Introductory Note preceding § 404. It se.em2 to be treated by the Restate-
ment as a constructive trust - § 202. A related type of case is where the
transfer is to a person not intended, treated in the RESTATEMENT, RESTITU-TI0, § 165 (1937), as a onstruetive trust. A pair of South Carolina cases
with facts of this kind desigate the relationship arising as a trust but do
not otherwise describe it. Watson v. Child, 9 Rich. E. 129 (5 S. C.1856);
Roberts v. Sith, 21 5. C. 455 (1883).
For most purposes the distinction between the resulting and the con-
Itructive trust is not important, since in either event the holder of the
legal title holds in trust for others. It is important however, in a situation
where the fiduciary has used both trust funds and individual funds in the
purchase of property in his name. If in good faith, the beneficiary has
only an equitable lien; if in bad faith the beneficiary has a choice between
a constructive trust and an equitable lien -9 athews v. Heyward, 2 S . C.
239 (1870) ; Green v. Green, ante; Buist v. Williams, 88 5. C. 252, 70 S. E.817 (1911); Ogilvie v. Smith, 215 5. C. 300, 54 5. E. 2d 860 (1949). This
is the view of the RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION - § 210 (1937). TheFdistinction between the two trusts may also be of importance with regard
tothe running of the Statute df Limitations - when it begins to operate.The resulting trust is presumably in keeping with the intention of the
parties; the constructive trust is not and is usually hostile. A disavowal
of the former would, if broughthome, s art the statute's running; knowl-
edge of he facts giving rise to the consotuctive trust would seem to be
the starting point for the statute.
24. It might lgiasibly be argued that the trust was in reality an ex-press oneu sincte intention of the administratix in taking title was to
take it as trustee. Her subsequent sigued petition to the Probate Court
would constitute a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of
Fruds. CO fe LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 67-1 (1952). The result in
ter ns gof t he Stahtte of Limitations, would be the same. Presbytean
Church v. Pendarvis, 227 s. C. 50, 86 k. E. 2d 740 (1955) - express
prust; tiller v. Saxt ne note 21 spra - reauting raust. In both cases
disavowal o repudiation to the knowledge of the bceteficiaries would give
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was guilty of fraud, a fact disclosed more than six years25
prior to the beginning of the action, (2) lapse of 27 years
from the time of the deed into the administratix to the time
of the action, and more than 20 years from the attainment
of age 21 by the youngest of the parties. The defense was
rejected because, according to the Court, the holding by the
original grantee was not adverse, and could not become so
unless and until there had been an open repudiation of the
trust by the trustee, the possession of the trustee being the
possession of the beneficiaries. It would appear that while
the holding of the last grantee was adverse - he was claim-
ing the land as his own, not as trustee - the action was
within time so far as that holding was concerned.
The defendant grantee claimed also as a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice, relying largely upon his attorney's
examination of and report on title. According to the Court,
however, the facts showed that the holder of the legal title
had actual notice of the respondents' equity, and the circum-
stances of his reliance upon counsel's advice based on the
record title would not protect him against the respondents'
equity.
In the accounting the lower court charged the appellant
with the rental value of the land not only for the period of
his holding but also the period of holding by his predecessor
in title. The Supreme Court held this to be error so far as
it charged the appellant with rents received by the appellant's
grantor prior to her conveyance. The Court noted that the
rents had been collected and consumed by the predecessor
in title with the consent of the respondents; but whether this
consent was the determinative factor is not made to appear.
The respondents' contention also was that "the entire corpus
of the trust" [does this mean the whole of the land?] for
both periods of owership was subject to their claim for rent
because their aunt "had agreed to account from the proceeds
of her part of the land." The Court held, on this score, that to
charge the land with accrued income would amount to en-
forcement of an oral agreement, in violation of the Statute
25. Why six years? Probably referable to CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA § 10-143 (1952). Would the period perhaps be ten years under
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 10-124, 10-2403 (1952), relating to
actions for recovery of real property and adverse possession (although an
action to impress a trust is not an action for the recovery of real property,
Bramlett v. Young, 229 S. C. 519, 93 S. E. 2d 853 (1956) ), or perhaps
under a catch-all ten-year statute, § 10-148?
252 [Vol. 15
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of Frauds.26 The Court also scaled down the annual amount
determined by the lower court as rental value, namely, $200
per year. This was reduced to $125 per year, based on the
evidence that the aunt had received as rent that amount for
three years prior to her conveyance, and there was no tes-
timony tending to show the rental value to be different from
the amount of rent actually received.
Trusts - Construction
Two cases27 involving the construction of wills which
created testamentary trusts have already been noted as
falling under the heading of Property. Whatever distinct
trust principles there may be in these cases, they are men-
tioned in the cases' treatment under Property and are subor-
dinate to the consideration of the kinds of equitable estates
created.
Discretionary Trusts - Jurisdiction
The case of Collins v. Collins28 was principally one involving
divorce, but it also was concerned with important questions
of trusts. The action was -brought by a wife against her
husband to obtain a divorce, and for support of herself
and their minor child. Joined as defendants were the two
trustees of a living trust which had been created for the
husband by his parents, and it was sought to compel the
trustees to make payment from the trust assets of the amounts
which might be decreed for the benefit of the wife and child.
On the merits the lower court's findings were in favor of
the plaintiff wife with a resultant decree of divorce. It con-
tained provision for stated payments to be made to the wife
for the benefit of herself and the child, and the trustees
were directed to pay these sums out of the trust assets.
A jurisdictional question was presented in that one of
the two trustees resided in North Carolina and the trust
assets were in that state. The non-resident trustee was sought
to be served by the mailing to him of the summons and
complaint; the papers were served personally upon the
trustee resident in South Carolina. The resident trustee
demurred on the grounds: that the complaint showed that
26. CODE oF LAws 0 SouTH CAROLINA § 67-1 (1952).
27. Black v. Gettys, note 14 supra; Leathers v. Leathers, note 15, supra.
28. 239 S. C. 170, 122 S. E. 2d 1 (1961).
1962]
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the plaintiff had no recourse against the trust estate, under
the terms of the trust; that there was no allegation showing
the trust assets to be within the court's jurisdiction; that a
defect of parties appeared, in that the non-resident trustee
was not subject to the court's jurisdiction. The non-resident
trustee, appearing specially, moved to set aside the service
upon him on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The lower
court overruled the demurrer, referring to it as the demurrer
of the two trustees, and did not expressly pass upon the
motion of the non-resident trustee. In the order overruling
the demurrer, the court held that it had jurisdiction of the
trust estate, and it directed that in the event of the husband's
failure to make the ordered payments that the trustees should
make the payments out of the income or corpus of the
trust estate.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court both on
the jurisdictional question and on the substance as to the
avgilability of the trust assets to the demands of the
wife.2 1a On the jurisdictional phase, the Court held that the
ipotion of the non-resident trustee to quas4 should have
been granted, stating: "The action was not in rem against
the #-ust assets, and manifestly could not be sustained as
such because they were not within the comts jurisdiction.
As an action in personam it could reach [the non-resident
trustee] only by service of the summons upon him within
28a. The question of what law would control - North Carolina or
South Carolina - in the construction of the trust instrument was not
raised. The trust instrument itself provided that it should be construed
*as to its administration by the laws of South Carolina regardless of the
domicile or residenie of the settlor or of the situs of the trust property.
It is to be note'd that the court assumed jurisdiction at least to the extent
of construing and determining the operation of tl~e trust instrument.
Although, as the Court held, there was no jurisdiction in personam over
the non-resident trustee, and although the trust assets were in another
state, there is no discussion of the pressing problem posed by the fact that
one of the trustees was in the state. If neither was in the state, and the
trust fupd was a lsQout of the state, the case against any assumption of
jurisdiction would be fairly clear; but with the ts created in Sbuth
Carolina by South Carolina parties, with South Carolina beneficiaries,
with the Qri inal l ustee in South Carolina, and, of major importance, pne
f the sustte trustees residing in South Caroina, there would at least
be strong argument that the South Carolina court would haye jurisdiction
of all matters concernng the tust and that it could compel the resident
trustee - whose right and contro over te trust res were coequal with
that of the non-resident trustee - to resort to the trust property to satisfy
the demands of the claimants. See 15 A.L.R. (2) 610; RESTATEMFNT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 297 (1934). Of course with the .4o1n(oin pnthe
merits - that the irpst assets could not 'be * pc - the apnaer Would
be academic in aiy event. I .. .
254 [Vol,. 15
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the jurisdiction or by his general appearance. Neither of
these events took place.
'2 )
In dealing with the resident trustee's demurrer, the Supreme
Court, in deciding that it should have been sustained, did
so on the single ground that the complaint showed that by
the terms of the trust instrument, the trust assets could
not be reached; and it declared that having disposed of the
demurrer on this ground, there was no need to explore the
other grounds. To reach the conclusion that there could be
no resort to the trust assets, the Court determined that the
trust was a discretionary trust, which, from its very nature,
conferred immunity against transferees and creditors of
the beneficiary.
The trust instrument directed the trustee (originally there
was only one) to invest the trust fund during the beneficiary's
minority, and then provided:
After Charles Collins attains age twenty-one years the
trustee is authorized in her sole discretion to pay to the
said Charles Andrew Collins or to apply for his benefit
or to pay over and deliver to him discharged of all trust
the whole or any part of the income or principal of the
trust estate to the extent that she shall determine that
he has habits of sobriety, thrift and economy and the
trustee is satisfied as to his ability to manage and con-
trol such property at the time of payment or distribution.
There was further provision that after the beneficiary
reached age twenty-eight he was to receive one-half of the
net income and that the trustee was to have the same
discretionary power to make additional payments as in the
initial period. Upon reaching age thirty-three the trust was
to terminate and the entire trust estate remaining was to
be paid over to the beneficiary free of trust. There were
other provisions with respect to the disposition of the estate
in the event of the beneficiary's death before the termination
of the trust.
The beneficiary at the time of the Court's opinion was
twenty-six years old. The Court said:
During the next six years if he lives so long, he will
by the express terms of the trust be entitled to only so
29. Legislation was enacted in the 1962 Session of the General Assembly,
probably in the light, or as a result, of this holding, to confer jurisdiction
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much of the income or principal as the trustees in their
sole discretion shall see fit to give him During that
period he cannot compel the trustees to pay any part
of the trust fund; and his creditors, who are in no better
position, cannot reach it.
In support of this conclusion the Court cites Restatement
of Trusts (2d), § 155 (1), and Scott on Trusts (2d Ed.) § 155.
The language of the Restatement - § 155(1) - is:
Except as stated in § 156 [trusts for benefit of Settlor]
if by the terms of the trust it is provided that the trustee
shall pay to or apply for a beneficiary only so much of
the income and principal or either as the trustee in his
uncontrolled discretion shall see fit to pay or apply, a
transferee or creditor cannot compel the trustee to pay
any part of the income or principal.
If the trust here was with certainty a discretionary one
then the result would as certainly be correct.8 0 But the dis-
cretion necessary to produce such a trust is an uncontrolled
discretion; and in the same section of the Restatement upon
which the Court relies it is stated (comment c):
The rule stated in this section is applicable only where
the trustee may in his absolute discretion refuse to make
any payment to the beneficiary or to apply any of the
trust property for his benefit. It is not applicable where
the trustee has discretion merely as to the time of pay-
ment, and where the beneficiary is entitled to the whole
or part of the trust property.
The same principle is stated in Scott on Trusts (2d Ed.)
§ 155, a section also relied upon by the Court. After stating
that "If the beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to pay
over any part of the trust fund, his assignee and his creditors
are in no better position," the section proceeds:
The result is different, however, where the trust is not
purely discretionary. The trust is purely discretionary
30. See the dictum in Heath v. Bishop, 4 Rich. Eq. 46, (S. C. 1851):
"If a trust be created with the view of providing against the improvidence
of the beneficiary, and it be directed that the rent and profits be paid to
him from time to time at the pure and absolute discretion of the trustee,
or as some other appointor to uses, may at his discretion appoint and
direct, with a limitation or power to appoint over, to other uses, such a
vague, undefined and uncertain interest in the beneficiary could not be
made subject to his debts; because such an interest does not amount to
property vested in him."
[Vol. 15
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where the trustee may withhold the income and principal
altogether, but not where he has discretion only as to
the time or method of making payment to the beneficiary
or applying the trust fund for his benefit. If the trustee
has not discretion to withhold the income and principal
altogether from the beneficiary, but merely has discretion
to determine the manner or method of making pay-
ment, the beneficiary can assign his interest and his
creditors can reach it, unless there was a valid restraint
upon alienation, or unless the trustee was to pay or apply
so much of the income or principal as should be necessary
for the support of the beneficiary. But the very fact that
a trust is discretionary is an indication that the testator
intended to impose a restraint on alienation, and to the
extent to which such a restraint is valid the beneficiary
cannot assign his interest and his creditors cannot
reach it.
It is apparent that the trustees in this case did not have
the absolute, pure or uncontrolled discretion that the rule
applicable to discretionary trusts calls for. The adjective
"sole" modifying "discretion" is hardly to be taken as synon-
ymous with absolute or uncontrolled, a consideration borne
out by the limitation of the discretion in making payment
to the existence or condition of the beneficiary's capacity
to manage his affairs and of his exemplary and suitable
character and habits. If in fact the beneficiary did possess
the requisite ability and character, a withholding arbitrarily
of income would be an abuse of discretion. Moreover, ul-
timately - except as to the beneficiary's death before the
time for distribution - all accumulated income and the
corpus had to be paid to him. As to this there was no dis-
cretion. Even if there were withholding - as there was -
the only effect was to prevent immediate payment, but not
to defeat payment at the various times set for distribution
and termination. Since, however, the trust was designed to
protect against the beneficiary's improvidence, it might be
regarded as an attempted restraint on alienation. How ef-
fective it would be would depend upon the extent to which
the law recognizes the restraint. No forfeiture provision
being attached, the restraint, if any was intended, would
present an attempt to create a spendthrift trust. Under the
present state of the law, the restraint as an effective one
1962]
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seems to be limited to equitable income or life interests.3'
Even so, if in this case the trust were to be regarded as a
spendthrift trust,32 there might still be the possibility that
the wife and children could fall into an excepted and special
class of claimants who, despite the spendthrift character,
might be able to reach the trust assets, both income and
principal.33
Trusts - Consideration
The case of Black v. Gettys,4 previously noted as dealing
principally with the nature of the estate created by a trust,
also concerns an independent problem arising under a sepa-
rate instrument designated "Stock Option Contract." The
question on this score was whether specific performance
of this so-called contract or option should be granted. The
instrument was under seal 5 and was signed by one John
31. Spann v. Carson, 123 S. C. 371, 116 S. E. 427 (1922); Lynch v.
Lynch, 161, S. C. 170, 159 S. E. 26 (1931); Albergotti v. Summers, 203
S. C. 137, 26 S. E. 2d 395 (1943). The statements of the Court in the first
two of these cases are largely dicta because in the first a legal fee simple
was involved; in the second a legal life estate to which a cessor was
attached. In the last case spendthrift trusts as such were specifically
upheld and made the basis for denying to the creditors of the beneficiary
recourse to the income interest, although the trust there would seem to
be more in the nature of a blended or inseparable trust. Here, however,
the Court was dealing with an income, not a principal interest, and its
remarks concerning the restriction on valid spendthrift trusts to equitable
life interests may also be, or border on, dicta. There are no clear-cut cases
in which the court has had to deal with an unmistakable attempt to
impose a restraint on the alienation of a beneficiary's right to principal or
fee. See the reservation of the Court in Leathers v. Leathers, note 15,
supra, as to whether a restraint on alienation of principal is effective.
(This case is discussed on this and other aspects in the subject of Prop-
erty.) The trend of the cases elsewhere, as is the view of the Restatement,
is to uphold restraints upon alienation of trust principal. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 153 (1959); ScoTT TRUSTS § 153 (2d ed. 1956).
32. That no particular form of words is necessary to impose a restraint
on alienation see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 152, comment c
(1959); Heath v. Bishop, note 30, supra; Albergotti v. Summers, note 31,
supra.
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 157 (1959), especially com-
ment b, referring to claims of dependents of the beneficiary. See. also,
SCOTT TRUSTS §§ 157, 157.1 (2 ed. 1956). See also 52 A.L.R. 1259 (1928);
104 A.L.R. 780 (1936). There are no South Carolina cases on the point.
Since the ultimate right of the beneficiary was contingent upon his
being alive at the periods for distribution and termination it may well be
that treating it as a contingent interest of a particular character, it could
not be reached on that account. Contingent interests may or may not be
reached depending upon the particular circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), TRUSTS § 162 (1959). For discussion of South Carolina law, see
13 S.C.L.Q. 106, 107, and notes (1960).
34. Note 14, supra.
35. The Record (p. 29) does not show that a seal was attached to the
paper, nor were the signatures of the parties followed by the terms "Seal"
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A. Black and his wife, Ola S. Black. It recited that Mrs.
Black was the owner of 53 shares in a Rock Hill bank and
that the parties were "in agreement that should said John
A. Black predecease his wife, Ola S. Black, then and in that
event, the interests of the said Ola S. Black and the children
of Ola S. Black would best be served if Ola S. Black should
place the aforesaid shares of stock in trust for the benefit
of herself and her children." Quoting from the case:
Mrs. Black then agreed, "in consideration of $5.00, love
and affection, and other valuable consideration," that
within four months after the death of her husband,
should he predecease her, she would sell and transfer
to Tom S. Gettys said bank stock at the price of $1 per
share in trust to hold and manage said property and pay
the net income to her for life, and after her death to pay
the net income in equal shares to their four children.3 6
The husband died, and in this action the wife resisted
attempt by the trustee named in the instrument to enforce
the contract specifically. The attack by her was based on
;several grounds, but the lower court denied all of them;
on appeal the only ground argued was that this instrument
was without actual consideration. On this point the lower
court had held that since the seal imported consideration,
lack of consideration, in the absence of fraud, could not be
shown; and it accordingly decreed specific performance.
In the decree it was stated that by the sealed instrument
or "L.S." or any symbol or scroll which might denote a seal. The paper,
however, did have a recital "In witness whereof we have hereunto set our
hands and seals." This is sufficient by statute to make the instrument
a sealed one. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 11-1, 57-253 (1952).
Without statute a mere recital of sealing would be insufficient. O'Cain v.
O'Cain 1 Strob. 402 (S. C. 1847).
36. Although styled "stock option contract," the instrument is far from
being a typical option. Other than in its heading the paper does not use
the word "option." It might, however, properly be called an option because
it provides that the owner of the stock will transfer on demand, at the
rate of $1.00 per share, within four months of the husband's death; and
it might further be treated as an option because of its unilateral character
- binding, or purporting to bind, the optioner but not the optionee.
McMahan v McMahan, 122 S. C. 336, 115 S. E. 293 (1922). Whether the
"demand" would bring into existence a main bilateral contract or whether
the main contract would become unilateral on tender or payment of
$1.00 a share is an interesting question but, in view of the outcome of the
case, not an important one. The instrument is unusual too in that both
the husband and the wife joined in its execution, pursuant to the recital
that the agreement was made between them, but the husband bound himself
to nothing - there was no promise or covenant on his part. The so-called
agreement between him and his wife that her interests and those of their
children would be served was at best only an understanding.
19621
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Mrs. Black had acknowledged that it promoted her interests
and those of her children and that she had acknowledged
receipt of $5.00 and other valuable consideration, and love
and affection. In her hearing before the referee, testimony
was received, subject to objection, tending to show that there
was no actual consideration involved; this the lower court
refused to consider.
The Supreme Court held the lower court to be in error in
refusing to consider the evidence as to lack of consideration,
and went further by saying that the instrument in question
patently disclosed that the wife's promise was gratuitous.
Conceding that a writing under seal cannot be attacked for
want of consideration, the Court noted, and held, however,
that Equity will not grant specific performance of a promise
without valuable consideration, even though the promise is
represented by a writing under seal.37 The issue that is raised
37. Citing as authority 49 AM. Ju., Specific Performance, § 17 (1943) ;
81 C.J.S.; Specific Performance, § 39 (1953); 3 POMEROY'S EQUITY JuRis-
PRUDENCE, § 1293 (4th ed. 1913), where it is said: "Equity will never
enforce an executory agreement unless there was an actual valuable
consideration, and, unlike the common law, it does not permit a seal to
supply the place of a real consideration." See also to same effect,
WILLISTON CONTRACTS (3rd ed. 1961) § 217, where it is stated: "Equity
will not specifically enforce or otherwise aid the covenantee of a voluntary
covenant, but will leave him to his remedy at law, except in a few cases,
thus enumerated by a learned writer [citing POUND, CONSIDERATION IN
EQUITY, 13 ILL. L. REV. 667, 668 (1919)1: (6) Options under seal." The
meaning here is that the presence of the seal, without more, makes the
option binding in the sense of an irrevocable offer - See, RESTATEMENT
CONTRACTS, 24 (1932). But whether the contract which arises upon the
exercise of the option will be specifically enforced depends upon whether
there is valuable and more than nominal consideration for the proposed
transfer. The nominal or formal consideration for the option is not im-
portant; the consideration for the transfer is important, and if it is
adequate, or at least not grossly inadequate, the contract arising from the
exercise of the option will be specifically enforced. CORBIN CONTRACTS, §
48 (1950), states the problem as follows: "Some courts have thought that
the absence of a consideration for an option is a sufficient reason for re-
fusing specific enforcement, sealing and delivery not having the meritorious
appeal that consideration has. It is believed that this is erroneous; the
better decisions held otherwise. In such cases, the decree is not one that
compels the offeror to give something for nothing. Even though it is only
a seal that makes the offer irrevocable, there is an agreed exchange that
the offeree will be compelled to make in return for the land. The promise
to convey is conditional upon the giving of this return performance. If it
is not so grossly inadequate as to shock the Chancellor's conscience, specific
enforcement seems to be equitable and just." To the same effect see
SIMPSON CONTRACTS, § 44 (1954). If there is an implication from the
case reviewed that there must be real consideration to make an option bind-
ing, and that it must be more than nominal, the implication is an un-
fortunate one. The question is not how much is given - and if under
seal whether anything is given - for the option, but what the optionee is
to pay for what he is to receive. In this case, if the agreement is really
an option, specific performance should be denied because only $1.00 a
share was to be paid for the stock. If the agreement is not really an option
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in this connection is principally one of Contracts and Equity
- although it is discussed at length in the last footnote -
and its impact in Trusts is not so great. Nonetheless it must
be noted, in this area, that while a trust can be created with-
- and there are equally as strong reasons for saying that it is not as for
saying that it is - the consequence is that it would be only a gratuitous
sealed promise, which equity would not specifically enforce.
There seem to be no South Carolina cases precisely in point, either with
respect to the binding character of options under seal or for nominal con-
sideration (though probably judicial notice would be taken of the fact that
customarily options are given for nominal sums) or with respect to specific
enforcement in equity of gratuitous sealed promises. There are indications,
however, in some cases that denial of specific performance will occur where
the covenant (the promise under seal) is voluntary. See Clarke v.
DeVeaux, 1 S. C. 172 (1869); Way v. Insurance Co., 61 S. C. 501, 510,
39 S. E. 742 (1901); Steinmyer v. Steinmyer, 55 S. C. 9, 31, 33 S. E. 15
(1898). The refusal of equity to reform deeds in favor of volunteers also
indicates the disregard of the seal despite its import of or substitution for
consideration. See Gowdy v. Kelly, 185 S. C. 415, 194 S. E. 456 (1937).
But there seems to be recognition of an exception to the rule that equity
will not aid a volunteer, that it looks at the substance and not the form,
in voluntary covenants in favor of a wife or children. See Williams v.
Caldwell, Bailey Equity 175 (S. C. 1831); Kennedy v. Gramling, 33 S. C.
367, 379, 11 S. E. 1081 (1890). Whether a gratuitous covenant by a wife
in favor of children would be similarly enforced is open to question. Even
in equity, sometimes, a gratuitous promise under seal has been enforced.
In Fogg v. Middleton, 2 Hill Equity 591 (S. C. 1837), the defendant gave
a bond to pay money to a trustee for the benefit of members of his family.
The bond was voluntary but the court professed to find consideration in a
desire by the obligor to prevent family discord, terming the consideration
"meritorious," if not valuable (p. 598). The effect of the seal is not
mentioned, although as a bond the instrument was sealed. The proceeding
was in equity because it was brought by the beneficiaries, who, where
the trustee does not sue his obligor, may sue in equity to avoid circuity of
action. The "meritorious" consideration depended upon here may be the
justification for the premise in Williams v. Caldwell, and Kennedy v.
Gramling.
Although specific enforcement in equity would not be granted, the
question still remains whether there was a remedy at law. The general
statement of the applicable principle is that while the gratuitous sealed
promise is the subject of remedy at law, it is not so in equity. See, again,
the statement of Williston previously quoted. A voluntary promise under
seal to pay a sum of money gives the promisee the right to sue at law for
the money. Carter v. King, 11 Richardson Law 125 (S. C. 1875); Godbold
v. Vance, 14 S. C. 458 (1880). It is not apprehended that a covenant to do
something other than to pay money is to be treated differently, and on
principle it would seem that the breach of the promise would give rise to
an action for damages. In the instant case, although there is equitable
denial, there would logically seem to be no reason to shut off recourse to
law.
The "stock option contract" contained virtually the same trust provisions
as the will of the husband; and it is apparent that the parties intended to
create a trust fund, comprised of two distinct trusts, based on a common
scheme. It might have been alleged that the real consideration for the
contract was the husband's making of his will, bargained for and carried
into effect. This position is weakened by the fact that the contract was
made some time after the making of the will, and unless it was made
pursuant to an agreement before or at the making of the will, the will
could not be regarded as consideration for the contract, except as past
consideration - which would be no consideration. Still, if the consideration
was past, the seal nevertheless would give validity to the promise - Mur-
1962]
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out consideration either by transfer or by declaration,38 a
promise to create a trust must, like other promises, have
consideration and these promises are tested from that van-
tage, by the law of Contracts ;39 and to the extent that a
promise under seal, without real consideration, can be en-
forced at law or in Equity, a promise made to a trustee -
either of a trust already in existence, or of a trust created
by the promise - can likewise be enforced.
Charitable Trust - Deviation - Parties
The latest in a long line of cases dealing with the title
to the various properties owned by Furman University is
Furman Univ. v. McLeod, Attorney Gen.40  It will serve no
useful purpose even to summarize the long history of litiga-
tion - and incidentally, legislation - or to depict the chain
of title. It is enough to point to the basic instruments
whose construction was involved. The suit here involved
the property of Furman University known as the Women's
Campus, in Greenville. The University, desiring to remove
from the congested area in which its campuses were located
rell v. Greenland, 1 DeSaussure 332 (S. C. 1793); Wilson v. Ferguson,
Cheves Law 190 (S. C. 1840) - except perhaps to the extent that equity
might not enforce it because the promisee did not rely, or change his
position in reliance, upon the promise. Of course it might also be argued
that the contract was made in consideration of the husband's not revoking
his will. But in all these suppositions it would have to be determined
whether in fact these things were bargained for and exchanged for the
promise.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 28, 29 (1959). Fogg v. Mid-
dleton, note 37 Supra, Clarke v. DeVeaux, note 37 Supra; Yancey v. Stone,
7 Richardson Equity 16 (S. C. 1854); Reilly v. Whipple, 2 S. C. 277
(1870); Withers v. Jenkins, 6 S. C. 122 (1874); Gadsden v. Whaley,
14 S. C. 210 (1880). The obvious case of gratuitous trust transfers is
the trust created by will.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 26, (1959), Comm. m, n; § 30.
In comment b of the latter section, it is said: "Whether a promise made
by the owner of property to become trustee thereof in the future or to
transfer the property in the future to another person in trust creates in
the promisee a right to recover damages for breach of the promise is
determined by the law governing Contracts." In § 26, comm. W, it is
stated: "A promise to create a trust in the future is enforceable if, but
only if, the requirements for an enforceable contract are complied with.
Whether a promise to transfer property in trust or to become trustee
creates in the promisee a right to recover damages for the breach of the
promise, and whether such a promise is specifically enforceable, are
determined by the law governing contracts." One of the methods of creat-
ing a trust is, as stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, § 17 (e)
(1959), by "a promise by one person to another person where rights there-
under are to be held in trust for another person." As already 
indicated, the
promise must be enforceable. The first two sections include as enforceable
promises those made under seal in states where the common law retains
the seal's effect.
40. 238 S. C. 475, 120 S. E. 2d 865 (1961).
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to a more suitable location outside the city, sought to de-
termine in this action the nature of its title and to obtain
a decree that it could sell the Women's Campus, or other-
wise utilize it, to aid in the relocation and development of
its new site. The only defendant was the Attorney General.
The original deed - in 1820 - from one Vardry McBee
to the predecessor of Furman University conveyed the prop-
erty in question, with other property, in trust, for the stated
consideration "of having a male and female academy estab-
lished near Greenville Court House (italics supplied) and in
consideration of $1.00 to me in hand paid by the trustees of
the said Academy for and on account of the same." The
habondum was "to have and to hold in trust for the use
of the said academy." In 1854 the land, less a portion
previously conveyed away, was transferred by the trustees,
who had been subsequently incorporated, to Furman Univer-
sity "upon the following conditions and trusts" that it should
"in all time to come keep and maintain a male and female
school in the village of Greenville (italics supplied) and
shall strictly carry out all the trusts in the said deed of
Vardry McBee." The greater part of the land was sold
by Furman University in 1869, except about five acres
retained as a campus site. In 1910 these five acres were
conveyed by Furman University to The State Convention of
the Baptist Denomination in South Carolina, the considera-
tion being stated as "in all time to come, keeping up and
maintaining in the City of Greenville (italics supplied) a
school." The habendum declared that the conveyance was
"upon the trust and condition" to maintain a school for
males and females in the City of Greenville. Later, in 1937,
with the consolidation of Furman University and Greenville
Woman's College, operated by the Denomination and whose
campus was the Women's Campus, the five acres plus other
small acreage was conveyed by Greenville Woman's College
and the Baptist Convention to Furman University in con-
sideration of its agreement to make provision for the educa-
tion of young women.
The central question was whether the deeds, with their
varying references to near Greenville and in Greenville im-
posed a duty upon the grantees as trustees to use the land
conveyed as the site for educationA! purposes. At the time
of the original deed the property was near Greenville; later it
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was in Greenville; now it was proposed to move the Univer-
sity outside of Greenville. The Supreme Court, adopting the
decree of the lower court, held that it was not the intention
of either the original grantor or any of the intermediate
grantors that the institutions be limited in their educational
operations to the property conveyed, and that "The primary,
and in fact the only, concern of the grantors was to have an
academy established and maintained somewhere in the vicinity
of Greenville." The Court reached this conclusion not only
from the language of the deeds themselves, but from the in-
terpretation of some of them in earlier litigation.
The Court went farther, however, and concluded that
even if the intention, under a strict construction, was to
confine the operation of the schools to the property itself,
the Court of Equity had the power to permit a deviation
by allowing a sale of the property because of necessity
and in order to carry out the terms of the trust.4 1
The defendant argued that to permit the requested sale
or other disposition would in effect be an application of cy
pres, which has no standing in South Carolina. 42 The conten-
tion was rejected, it being said that:
the cy pres doctrine has no application in the instant
case as there is here no diversion of the trust and no
transfer of assets to a different charity or a different
purpose. If anything there is only a deviation from
the strict or technical terms of the trust to enable the
same charitable institution to better fulfill the purposes
for which it was organized and to carry out to the
fullest extent possible, the interest and purposes of the
grantors of the property in question.
43
41. Citing, among others, SCOTT, TRUSTS § 380 (2 ed. 1956); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUSTS 2d § 381 (1959), comm. d; Frierson v. Porter
Academy, 217 S. C. 168, 60 S. E. 2d 82 (1950); McManaway v. Clapp,
150 S. C. 249, 148 S. E. 18 (1928). See, also, Patton v. First Presbyterian
Church, 129 S. C. 15, 123 S. E. 493 (1924), in which sale of church
property held in trust was authorized on the theory of judicially permis-
sible change of investment. The cases in which a trustee in a private
trust has been permitted to deviate, particularly by selling, are too num-
erous for citation.
42. Citing Mars v. Gibert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1912); City of
Columbia v. Monteith, 139 S. C. 262, 137 S. E. 727 (1926) ; 1 S.C.L.Q. 331
(1949). See, also, Attorney General v. Jolly, 2 Strobhart Equity 379
(S. C. 1848) ; Pringle v. Dorsey, 3 S. C. 502 (1872) ; Harter v. Johnson,
122 S. C. 96, 107, 115 S. E. 217 (1922).
43. The statement may be a bit too broad, as the (judicial) Cy pres
doctrine is essentially based on what the settlor presumably intended -
that is, if the particular charity or purpose failed the fund should be used
[Vol. 15
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It was also held that there were no conditions attached to
the various grants which on non-user or alienation of the
property would cause a reverter to any party. The con-
clusion was based largely on the interpretation of the original
deed of Vardry McBee, in litigation to which possible claimants
under him were made parties.44 The other factor leading to the
conclusion was that, as the court construed them, the other
deeds created a public trust, with no private rights of reverter
or reversion. 45 Because no private rights were involved, the
Court held that the Attorney General was the "only proper
and necessary party defendant" to the proceeding, as part
of his duty imposed by statute" to enforce the due applica-
for a purpose cognate to the original purpose. That the sale of the trust
property which has been used as the site of the charity's operations is not
application of cy pres but within the scope of the power of the court to
control the administration of the trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS, § 399 (1959), comm. p. See Mars v. Gibert, note 42, Supra;
Patton v. First Presbyterian Church, note 41, Supra; 55 A.L.R. 880 (1928).
44. Furman University v. Glover, 226 S. C. 1, 83 S. E. 2d 559 (1954),
which, while saying the same thing as to the Women's Campus, stated that
as to possible rights of others than the heirs of McBee, they were subject
to future adjudication. This holding led to the bringing of the instant
case.
45. This conclusion was reached despite the words "upon the folowing
conditions (italics supplied) and trust" in the 1854 deed from the trustees
of Greenville Academy to Furman University, and "upon the trust and
condition" (italics supplied) in the 1910 deed of Furman University to the
State Convention of the Baptist Denomination. That even the use of the
words "upon condition" does not necessarily create a true condition, see
MeManaway v. Clapp, note 41, Supra; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §
10 (1959). And see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, § 401 (1959), comm.
b: "Where property is given 'upon condition' that it be applied to a cer-
tain charitable purpose, a charitable trust is ordinarily created thereby
and ordinarily the trust instrument is interpreted as not imposing a con-
dition, in the absence of a provision that upon a failure to apply the
property to the designated purpose the property should revert to the
settlor or his heirs." If, perchance, a true condition subsequent had been
created, there would be a reverter to or right of re-entry in the grantors or
their successors - an academic problem in the deed by Furman University,
since Furman University is the present owner, but not quite so academic
as to the trustees of the Greenville Academy. A true condition or limitation
attached to the use of property given for charitable purposes will be given
effect. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS, §§ 401, 399, comm. p (1959),
the latter stating: "The court will not, however, permit the removal of
the institution if the settlor provided that the trust should continue only
so long as the institution should be maintained on the lands or that the
trust should terminate if the institution were not maintained on the land."
For an instance of a forfeiture provision in the event of abandonment,
attached to a trust for charitable purposes, see Purvis v. McElveen, 234
S. C. 94, 106 S. E. 2d 913 (1959). In the absence of a condition or limita-
tion, there is no reverter for breach of trust such as by non-user or divert-
ing to other purposes; the remedy is by action by the Attorney General,
or persons having a direct interest, to redress the breach or to compel en-
forcement of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 401, comm. a.
(1959).
46. Referring to CODE OF LAWS OF SoTH CAROLINA § 1-240 (1952).
There are similar provisions in CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 67-73
(1952).
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tion of funds given to charitable purposes and to prevent
breaches of trust; and that as representative of the public,
he was the proper party to protect the public interest.47
The holding that the Attorney General was the "only proper
and necessary party" again raises the question whether the
cases have come around to holding that the Attorney General
is a necessary party not only in actions involving admin-
istration of a charitable trust and, as here, the construction
of a charitable trust instrument, but in actions to determine
the yalidity of an attempted charitable trust. This case and
the earlier case of Watson v. WaZi 45 go far towards a -view
that in all cases in which the public interest may be affected
the Attorney General is not only a proper but a necossrY
party to them.4 9
Although, at the outset of the review of this case, it was
stated that the Supreme Court had adopted as its opinion
the decree of the lower court, it did not adopt - so the
opinion states - a portion of it (referred to as subsection
5 pf the last paragraph of the decree). Tbo unadopted
section enjoined and barred the Attorney General and his
puccessors in office and all other persons from question-
ing in any judicial proceeding Furman University's right
to "use, sell, convey, develop, mortgage, alien or otherwise
dispose of" the lands comprising the Women's Campus or
the University's removal and tr~msfer of its Qperations. - 0
In holding that no private rights were created or reserved by he various
deeds, and thereby justifying the proceeding against the Attorney Geperal
as the sole defendant, the court rejected fhe Attorney General's contention
that others might have rights under the deeds and that they should be
made parties. Exception III, Record, p. 67; Appellant's Brief, pp. 20, 21.
Quae, whether possible claimants asserting breach of conditiop wofildbe precluded from instituting action to determine their rights, conceding
that the outcome on the merits would be against -hem? Cf. Schrpder v.Antipas, 214 S. C. 87, 51 S. E. 2d 365 (1949).
47. Cf. Ex Part Carolina Ai Association, 185 . C. 132, 193 S. E. 642(1937). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), T3UST6, § 391 (1949) - Who 
Can
Enforce a Charitable Trust.
48. 229 S. C. 500, 93 S. E. 2d 918 (1956).
49. See the discussion of the problem in 10 S.C.cQ. 151, 156, 157 (1957).
In his brief in this case (pp. 17-2Q) the Attor~ey Venergl dpalt with the
broad problem and asked the couA to 'declare that 'in all actions where
the validity of an attempted charitable trust mey be Ie~ted or Wherp the
court is called upon to construe a public trust ustrument and issue instrauc-
tions for the admipistration of the trust, ilAe Attorney, neral is not 64ly
a yroper party, but, also, a necessary party thereto." P.ephaps biecause the
validity of the trusts created by the various instiuments was not in ques-
tion the court declined to accede to the Attorney General's suggestion -
not by rejecting it but in passing it by.
50. Record, p. 66.
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This portion of the ,decree was excepted to by the Attorney
,General.51 Although the Court does not specifically deal
with the exception, or give its reason for not adopting that
portion of the decree, it is clear that its refusal to embrace
the decree in this respect amounts to an upholding of the
,exception.
LEGISLATION
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act
The Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act was
adopted by the General Assembly in the 1961 Session,
52
-but in somewhat -garbled form due to a printing error. The
scope and purpose of the Act, as originally and correctly
proposed, and the fact and nature of the error, are discussed
in the 1961 Annual Survey.53 In the 1962 Session the error,
which was one of omission, has been corrected,5 4 and as
corrected conforms to the Uniform Act promulgated by the
Commissioners on Uniform Laws.55
Inter Vivos Trusts - Service
Probably as a result of the decision in Collins v. Collins,50
reviewed earlier, legislation was enacted in the 1962 Session
of the General Assembly5 7 to make non-resident trustees
amenable to the jurisdiction of the South Carolina courts.
The Act provides that service on a resident trustee of an
inter vivos trust shall constitute service on all other trustees,
resident and non-resident, "for the purpose of adjudicating
any action or proceeding in a court of this State, involving
directly or indirectly, such trust." JIt is further provided
that the resident trustee shall within five days after service
upon him notify the other trustees of the action, but that
his failfre to do so shall not impair the action. A criminal
penaltky is provided 'for failure to notify - on conviction,
51. Record,, pp. 67, 68. The argument in support of the position was that
injunction could not issue against a public official except to permit irrep-
arable injury or where necessary to prevent a multiplicity of suits or
vexatious litigation., Appellant's Brief, pp. 25, 26.
52. Act No. 163, 52 Stat. 223 (1901).
53. 14 S.C.L.Q. 281 (1962).
54. Act No. 816, 52 Stat. 1962 (1962).
55. The, 1961 Act appeara in the 1962 Code of Laws as §§ 19-295 through
19-298. ,The 1962 change, which is an amendment of the 1961 Act, pre-
sumably.operates as well as an amendment to the 1962 Code provisions.
56. Note 28, Supra.
57. Act No. 810, 52 Stat. 1955 (1962).
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a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or imprisonment
for not more than thirty days. There is further provision
for service upon a non-resident trustee when there is no resi-
dent trustee; the non-resident trustee is deemed to have
consented to service in connection with proceedings involv-
ing the trust through service upon the Secretary of State
"when the trust was created under the laws of this State
or, in the case of a foreign trust, when part of the trust
property is situate in this State."
Presumably, in the light of the events leading to this legis-
lation, the Act is designed to afford jurisdiction not merely
in actions by a beneficiary but by third persons seeking to
reach the trust estate. The language "involving, directly or
indirectly, such trust" would appear to indicate this intention.
How efficacious this legislation may be, and to what extent
it may affect trusts enacted before its passage, remains to
be seen.
The legislation, it will be noted, is limited to inter vivos
trusts. Non-resident testamentary trustees are supposedly
subject to service and jurisdiction by the provisions of another
existing statute, or other statutes.58
58. As to this there is confusion. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §
'67-53 (1952), as amended, refers to the withholding of "letters of appoint-
tnent" by the Probate Judge or the Court of Common Pleas from non-
residents as trustees unless bond is furnished and there is designation of
u person on whom service of process may be had. Since testamentary
iustees are not named or appointed by the Probate Court or by the
Court of Common Pleas (except by the latter court to fill vacancies), the
statute does not have meaning (though perhaps intended to) as to original
trustees named by a will. See 13 S.C.L.Q. 119 (1960). There is another
Code section, however, § 10-433, amended in 1955 (49 Stat. 456), dealing
with service "upon any individual non-resident, executor, administrator,
guardian, committee or trustee" by the designation by the fiduciary of
a person upon whom service might be had and in the absence of such
designated agent, death, etc., service may be had upon the Probate Judge
or the Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas of the county "wherein the
application of such fiduciary for appointment was made." The statute
makes no distinction between inter vivos and testamentary trusts, but it
should be noted that it speaks of the county in which application of such
fiduciary for appointment was made. Since the trustee of an inter vivos
trust does not obtain his appointment through a court (except where there
is substitution or addition filled by judicial appointment), the applicability
of this statute to original testamentary and inter vivos trustees is as
doubtful as § 67-53.
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